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EVIDENCE
PROOF OF OTHER CRIME
The defendant was convicted of the murder of one Jacob Wagner.
The state claimed that the defendant had caused the death of Wagner
by administering poison. During the trial of the case, over the objec-
tions of the defendant's counsel, the state introduced evidences of the
deaths by poison of several other men, all of similar circumstances and
who had been friends of the- defendant. In State v. Hahn, 59 Ohio
App. 178, 17 N.E. (2d) 392 (1938), the court held that the evidence
was admissible, and the statute under which it was admitted was consti-
tutional.
Ordinarily, evidence that the defendant has committed other crimes
is not admissible to show that he committed the crime charged. While
proof of other crimes would have some relevancy, there are dangers of
confusing the jury and prejudicing the defendant in going into these
collateral matters and of forcing the accused to defend all the alleged
acts of his career. In State v. Adams, 2o Kan. 311 (1878), the general
rule was well stated-"It is dear, that the commission of one offense
cannot be proved on the trial of a party for another, merely for the
purpose of inducing the jury to believe that he is guilty of the latter,
because he committed the former."
But numerous exceptions have been engrafted upon the rule. In
People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 6I N.E. 286 (1901), it was said,
"Evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime
charged in the indictment, when it tends to establish (I) motive, (2z) in-
tent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or
plan, embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to
each other that proof of one tends to establish the others, and (5) the
identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on
trial." In such cases as receiving stolen goods, passing counterfeit
money, and obtaining property under false pretenses, the exception has
long been recognized. But proof of other crimes is not limited to such
cases.
In Rex v. Smth, ii Crim. App. 229 (1915), the defendant was
convicted of the murder of a woman with whom he had gone through
the forms of marriage, although he was married at the time. The victim,
in this case, was found drowned in a bathtub. The prosecution was
permitted to show that the defendant also married two other women,
and that they both died in bathtubs under circumstances similar to those
attending the death of the deceased. Another homicide case in which
evidence of a previous crime was admitted was that of Jenkins v. State,
S32
191 Ark. 625, 87 S.W. (2d) 78 (1935). In this case, the defendant
was indicted for poisoning and killing her children. Evidence was
admitted to show that she had attempted to poison her husband several
weeks before the death of her children. A recent Pennsylvania case,
Commonwealthv. Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 169 Atl. 564 (933), involved
an insurance fraud. Evidence was admitted of deaths by means of
poison other than the specific one charged in the indictment.
The Ohio cases are clearly in line with the general rule and its
exceptions. In Whiteman v. State, n Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51
(1928), the defendants were indicted for robbery. Evidence of similar
robberies was admitted by the court in sustaining the conviction of the
lower court. The Supreme Court said, after reciting the general rule,
"While the rule itself is fundamental and well settled by a long line of
adjudication, it is equally fundamental and well settled that in certain
classes of cases, collateral offenses may be shown, as where such collateral
offenses have been executed according to a plan or method, and it is
shown that the accused persons committed such other offenses, and in
so doing followed the same plan or method as is shown to have been
followed in the commission of the crime charged in the indictment."
A conviction of larceny of an automobile was sustained in Patterson v.
State, 96 Ohio St. 9o, 117 N.E. 169 (1917), where the state relied
for conviction upon proof of a criminal plan to steal various automobiles
other than those charged in the indictment.
An Ohio statute, section 13444-I9, now provides, "In any crim-
inal case where the defendant's motives, intent, absence of mistake or
accident on his part, any like act or other acts of the defendant which
may tend to show motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident on
his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system of doing the act in
question may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or
prior or subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may show
or tend to show the commission of another or subsequent crime by the
defendant." The statute was enacted in 1929. It has frequently been
held that the statute is simply a reiteration of the common law, and so
its constitutionality is beyond question. State v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.
237, 174 N.E. 768 (1931); Russo v. State, 126 Ohio St. 114, 184
N.E. 241 (1933); Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Insurance Co., 132
Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E. (2d) 153 (1936). In recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Ohio where the statute was questioned, appeals were
dismissed, the court holding that no debatable constitutional question
was involved. State v. Salupo, et al., 131 Ohio St. 370, 2 N.E. (2d)
865 (1936); State v. Pleyer, 131 Ohio St. 613, 3 N.E. (2d) 422
(1936). PAUL WARD
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